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Abstract
Many scholars, from different disciplines, use the category of “legal pluralism” to explain the legal di-
mension of Western societies’ increasing cultural, religious and social differentiation. As a particularly 
complex concept, the notion of “legal pluralism” requires to be deeply investigated in order to better 
understand its many implications and increase its explanatory potential as a paradigm for unders-
tanding the legal complexity of highly diversified societies. In this regard, the contribution of Italian 
legal scholarship offers precious inspiration. On the one hand, Santi Romano – a legal thinker active 
in the first half of the 20th century –can be considered one of the founding fathers of legal pluralism: 
with his masterpiece L’ordinamento giuridico (1918), he delved into the issue of legal pluralism from 
an anti-formalist perspective, in opposition to legal positivism. On the other hand, the works of Paolo 
Grossi – a distinguished historian of law who addressed legal pluralism as a characteristic of law in the 
Middle Ages – are also very important for the study of law in contemporary Europe, since he criticizes 
the dominant legal reductionism and promotes the objective dimension of law as a social institution. 
Keywords: Legal pluralism. Social complexity. Institutionalism. Legal positivism.
1 Introduction
The paradigm of “legal pluralism”, althou-
gh composite and quite controversial, has proved 
to be one of the most fortunate interpretive cate-
gory of the relationship between law and society 
and has recently gained a new centrality thanks 
to the increased complexity of contemporary legal 
orders, both at the national and the global level. In 
particular, legal pluralism seems to be a useful con-
ceptual tool in framing some of the many articula-
tions of this complexity, such as Western societies’ 
increasing cultural, religious and social differen-
tiation. As is well known, this diversification and 
fragmentation of contemporary Western socie-
ties is due to different phenomena, such as immi-
gration-related cultural and religious pluralism1, 
1  See VERTOVEC, Steven. Super-diversity and its 
implications. Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 30 
n. 6, p. 1024-1054, Nov. 2007, who, in his seminal 
article, framed the increasing complexity of con-
increasing social complexity in terms of lifestyles 
options and spaces for self-determination (e.g. in 
the framework of personal relationships and fa-
mily law), multiple belonging to overlapping legal 
systems at local, national and transnational level. 
temporary societies due to migrations and human 
mobility as “super-diversity”. Far from being at-
tributable to the sole British society, the process 
of “diversification of diversity” – which “compli-
cates” diversity beyond the ethnic dimension – is 
a key feature of social and legal complexity of 
Western immigration countries, with the result-
ing “multiplication of significant variables that 
affect where, how and with whom people live” 
(1025). These additional variables to be consid-
ered include “differential immigration statuses 
and their concomitant entitlements and restric-
tions of rights, divergent labour market experi-
ences, discrete gender and age profiles, patterns 
of spatial distribution, and mixed local area re-
sponses by service providers and residents”, so 
that […] “super-diversity” “points to the necessity 
of considering multi-dimensional conditions and 
processes” and has to be understood as the inter-
play of different factors concerning immigrants in 
contemporary societies (1049).
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Nevertheless, the notion of “legal pluralism” 
itself is marked by a high degree of complexity: 
far from identifying a specific discipline or a uni-
tary perspective, it can be rather considered as a 
“broad area of discussion and exchange, where 
legal philosophers, anthropologists and sociolo-
gists, along with practitioners and activists, have 
held and continue to hold heated debates on many 
key legal issues”2. A distinction which proves to be 
particularly significant in the current debate on 
the legal fragmentation of contemporary societies 
is that between an “objective” and a “subjective” 
legal pluralism. While the first one deals with the 
plurality of legal systems within a given territory 
with a systemic or institutional approach, the sec-
ond one focuses on individuals and the choices 
that subjects make between norms from different 
sources and of different contents3, with an “actor 
perspective” that enhances the active role of in-
dividuals in producing their own law. In parti-
cular, this “subjective” dimension has been con-
ceptualized as a critique of the traditional legal 
pluralism (for example, that elaborated by John 
Griffiths4), which was regarded as undermining 
the rule of law, being limited by an institutional 
perspective of law and presenting an essentialist 
image of normative orders and communities5.
As a particularly complex concept, and giv-
en its heterogeneity, the notion of “legal plural-
ism” requires to be deeply investigated in order 
to better understand its many implications and 
2  See CROCE, Mariano. Self-sufficiency of Law. A 
Critical-Institutional Theory of Social Order. Ed. 
London: Springer, 2012, p. 67. Among the many 
authors who variously deepened the issue of legal 
pluralism with regard to contemporary societies: 
Griffiths, Petersen and Zahle, Vanderlinden, Chi-
ba, Engle Merry, Falk Moore, Menski, Shah, Sousa 
Santos, Teubner, Macdonald, Wolkmer.
3  See, for example, KLEINHANS, Martha-Marie, 
MACDONALD, Roderick A. What is a Critical Legal 
Pluralism? Canadian Journal of Law and Society, v. 
12, p. 25-46, Fall 1997; VANDERLINDEN, Jacques. 
Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later. Jour-
nal of Legal Pluralism, n. 28, p. 149-157, 1989.
4  See GRIFFITHS, John. What is Legal Pluralism? 
Journal of Legal Pluralism. v. 24, 1986, p. 1-55.
5  KLEINHANS Martha-Marie, MACDONALD 
Roderick A. What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?, 
cit., p. 32 and s. The subjective perspective seems 
more suitable to conceptualize the legal diversifi-
cation of Western immigration societies, in which 
individuals follow rules deriving from different 
legal systems: “not only the positive laws of their 
country of origin, but also religious, customary, 
transnational and infranational rules that often 
have a personal or ethnic, rather than territorial, 
validity”, see FACCHI, Alessandra. Customary 
and Religious Law: Current Perspectives in Legal 
Pluralism, 2007, <www.juragentium.it>.
increase its explanatory potential as a paradigm 
for understanding contemporary social complex-
ity. In fact, the extraordinary changes of Western 
societies’ social and legal configuration question 
legal scholars, among the other social scientists, 
with regard to the reformulation of heuristic cat-
egories, theoretical frameworks and methodolo-
gies. This effort of refining interpretive legal tools 
hinges on a deeper knowledge of their historical 
and conceptual implications, in order to better 
face the multifaceted challenges both a method-
ological and substantial level. To this purpose, 
this article aims to highlight the precious contri-
bution of two prominent Italian legal scholars – 
Santi Romano and Paolo Grossi – whose works 
are unfortunately marginal in some contexts (as 
the Anglophone legal scholarship), or at least 
too marginal compared to their objective value, 
mainly because of the language barrier.
2 Santi Romano: law as insti-
tution
Santi Romano was a legal scholar active in 
Italy in the first half of the 20th century6; he can 
be considered as one of the most important Italian 
jurists, if not the major Italian jurist, of all time. He 
had a peculiar education and research path that 
certainly contributed to his complex, with partic-
ular reference to the role of the State and its law in 
the framework of a legal pluralist conception7.
Santi Romano was one of the leading expo-
nent of the institutional theory of law – whose 
foundations had been laid by the French Maurice 
Hauriou only some years before Romano’s 1918 
masterpiece8 – and is considered to be one of the 
6  He was born in Palermo (Sicily) on the 31st of Janu-
ary 1875 and he died in Rome in 1947. On the Ro-
mano’s theorization of legal institutionalism and 
legal pluralism as deeply rooted in the Italian legal 
and political culture, see ZANETTI, Gianfrances-
co. Italian Normative Pluralism: What is Unique 
about the Future of Italy. California Italian Stud-
ies, 2(1), 2011.
7  For an excellent analysis of Romano’s prismatic 
figure and scientific production, as articulated in 
four activity periods, see SANDULLI, Aldo. San-
ti Romano and the Perception of the Public Law 
Complexity. Italian Journal of Public Law, 1(1), p. 
1-38, 2009. 
8  See HAURIOU, Maurice. L’institution et le droit sta-
tutaire. Récueil de Législation de Toulouse, 2e série, 
T. 11, p. 134-182, 1906, and HAURIOU, Maurice. 
Principes de droit public. Ed. Paris: Librairie de la 
Société du recueil J.-B. Sirey & du journal du pa-
lais, p. xi-734, 1910. Romano is often associated also 
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founding fathers of legal pluralism, which he del-
ved into from an anti-formalist perspective, in 
opposition to legal positivism.
He published his masterpiece L’ordinamento 
giuridico in 1918 and since then this small book 
has quickly become an essential point of referen-
ce for legal scholars; in fact, virtually all the ma-
jor Italian legal scholars, both in the first and in 
the second half of the 20th century, have felt the 
need to take their own position with respect to 
the arguments put forward by Santi Romano. 
The fortune of the book outside Italy is an 
interesting issue to highlight, starting from the 
existence of foreign translations. In fact, while 
Romano’s work has been translated in Spanish (El 
ordenamiento jurídico, 1963), French (L’ordre juri-
dique, 1975), German (Die Rechtsordnung, 1975) 
and Portuguese (O ordenamento jurídico, 2008), 
shockingly there is no English translation. Accor-
ding to Norberto Bobbio, this would confirm the 
traditional Anglo-American ignorance of the Ita-
lian legal culture9. The lack of an English version 
had a crucial role in the (inadequate) dissemina-
tion of Romano’s works, which undoubtedly is a 
“considerable loss for the Anglophone world”10. 
Fortunately, some articles and essays on Roma-
no’s thought have been written in recent years to 
fill this knowledge gap and partially remedy that 
very loss11.
to the reflections on law and society by some out-
standing legal sociologists as Durkheim, Gurvitch 
and Ehrlich, but he himself pointed out he consid-
ered the “institution” from a legal (and not socio-
logical) point of view, as a “system of objective law”, 
see ROMANO, Santi. L’ordinamento giuridico. Ed. 
Firenze: Sansoni, 1967, (or. ed. 1918), p. 96-97.
9  See BOBBIO, Norberto. Teoria e ideologia nella 
dottrina di Santi Romano. In: BOBBIO, Norberto. 
Dalla struttura alla funzione. Nuovi studi di teoria 
del diritto. Ed. Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2007 (or. ed. 
1975). The concept of “legal order”, although it is 
fundamental in European public law, is less “gen-
eral theoretical” than we are used to believe today. 
For a long time it was almost untranslatable into 
English: according to the first British judge at the 
Court of Justice, Lord Alexander J. Mackenzie Stu-
art, in English the neologism “legal order” could be 
confused with the expression of “law and order”, 
see ITZCOVITCH, Giulio. Ordinamento giuridi-
co, pluralismo giuridico, principi fondamentali. 
L’Europa e il suo diritto in tre concetti. Diritto 
pubblico comparato e europeo. n. 1, 2009, p. 36. 
10  See PAULSSON, Jan. The Idea of Arbitration. Ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013, p. 307, n. 20.
11  See, for example, SANDULLI, Aldo. Santi Romano, 
cit.; LA TORRE, Massimo. Law as Institution. Ed. 
London: Springer, 2010, p. 98-115; FONTANELLI, 
Filippo. Santi Romano and L’ordinamento giurid-
ico: The Relevance of a Forgotten Masterpiece for 
Contemporary International, Transnational and 
Global Legal Relations. Transnational Legal Theo-
The book is composed of two chapters − 
“The concept of legal order” and “The plurality of 
legal orders and their relations”. 
2.1 The concept of legal order
In the first chapter the author develops his 
anti-formalist perspective on law, in opposition 
to the legal positivist paradigm based on the as-
sumption that “law” is equivalent to “norms” or 
to “legal order” as made by norms.
Right from the start Romano focuses on 
the concept of “legal order”, which should not be 
understood as a sum of various parts but as an 
effective “unit” in itself, resulting in something 
different from its components. But if law is not 
reducible to legal norms12, what are its essential 
elements and what is that “quid” which identifies 
the legal order as a unit in itself? 
According to Romano, the concept of law is 
identified by the concepts of society, social order 
and institution. 
The intimate connection between law and 
society has two, interpenetrating, senses: ubi ius 
ibi societas (what does not come out from the pu-
rely individual sphere – what does not exceed the 
life of the individual as such – is not “law”) and 
ubi societas ibi ius (there is no “society” without 
the manifestation of “law”). This last statement 
requires the notion of “society” to be clarified: 
Romano intends “society” as an entity that is, for-
mally and extrinsically, a concrete unit, distinct 
from the individuals who are part of it. 
ry, 2(1), 2011, p. 67-117; CROCE, Mariano. Self-suf-
ficiency of Law, cit., p. 76-80, 113-119. Fontanelli 
(p. 70) observes that “a remarkable exception to 
the general ignorance of Romano’s thought in An-
glo-Saxon scholarship is Julius Stone’s 1966 vol-
ume on jurisprudence, which chapter 11 discusses 
institutionalism and Romano’s works extensively” 
(see STONE, Julius. Social Dimensions of Law and 
Justice. Ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1966, p. 516-555).
12  Romano challenges the traditional, positivist, 
conception of legal norms as differentiating from 
other kind of “norms” for their formal characters: 
objectivity and legal sanction. With regard to the 
former, the Author thinks that the legal order’s 
objectivity certainly refers to – and reflects on – 
norms, but it always originates from a time that is 
(logically and chronologically) prior to norms. As 
for the latter, the sanction may not be contained 
in – and imposed by – any specific norm, and it 
can rather be immanent and latent in the “gear”, 
the apparatus, of the legal order; in this case the 
sanction functions as a force, a “practical guaran-
tee”, that operates indirectly and does not result in 
any subjective right or legal norm, see ROMANO, 
Santi. L’ordinamento giuridico, cit., p. 18-24. 
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The idea of social order is also a crucial ele-
ment insofar it allows to exclude all the phenome-
na marked by “pure arbitrariness” and “material 
force”: every social manifestation – simply becau-
se it is “social” – is governed by an “order”, at least 
with regards to its members.
The third and last essential element – that 
of “institution” – is undoubtedly the most distin-
guishing feature of Romano’s theory (that, in fact, 
is also known as “institutionalist” theory). Accor-
ding to Romano every social entity, or social body, 
is an institution, provided it has an objective and 
concrete existence. “Organization” is a key con-
cept to understand the essence of institutions, 
since it is able to transpose social facts into the 
legal domain by linking the notions of “institu-
tion” to that of “legal order”: in fact, according 
to Romano, law is first of all “position” (in the 
sense of “the act or process of positing”), that is 
the organization of a social entity. In this way law 
continues to be defined from a formal perspecti-
ve, its material content being uninfluential to its 
concept. “Law as institution” means that non-law 
is only what is irrevocably anti-social, namely in-
dividual by nature. Institutions can be classified 
according to their scope (i.e. religious, ethical, 
economic, artistic, educational, etc.) but each of 
them, as an institution, is also a legal order.
The adoption of such a theoretical fra-
mework obviously implies identifying law (and 
legal orders) also beyond State law and Romano 
tests his definition of law by exploring some rele-
vant examples and case studies (in the first chap-
ter but especially in the second one, dedicated to 
the plurality of legal orders).
As for the international legal order, the de-
bated issues traditionally concern the definition 
and the autonomy of international law, that some 
theories consider a mere manifestation or projec-
tion of States (internal) law. Romano asserts the 
international legal order is an “institution” and 
international law “posits itself” in the same way 
as State law: international law is the immanent 
order of states community and it is inseparable 
from it; it must be sought in the institution in 
which that same community materializes, before 
focusing on the single legal rules sanctioned by 
specific treaties13.
The Catholic Church is also a legal order 
that does not derive its legal character from State 
law. The Church and the State are two “legal wor-
lds”; two different and distinct orders each one 
13  Ivi, p. 64.
with its own sphere, legal sources, organization, 
sanctions.
Romano also formulates very interesting ar-
guments concerning those “small institutions”, 
such as families or households, that are also la-
belled as “legal microcosms”. The “conjugal so-
ciety” – although it is based on the (bilateral) 
marriage relationship14 – is usually shaped as “fa-
mily”, namely an institution that is a “continuing 
unity”, a “social body” organized on the basis of 
state regulations, common goals to be pursued or 
the relationship between its current and future 
members. In the same way, a household can be 
considered a “small legal order” that is ruled by 
one (or more) individual(s) and is legally binding 
on family members, employees, guests, items, etc. 
This “household law” must not be confused with 
those State norms dedicated to some house rela-
ted aspects (such as the constitutional protection 
of personal domicile) since the former constitutes 
an internal, autonomous, order that unifies diffe-
rent elements (persons and things) under a uni-
que government and direction.
Maybe one of the best known example pro-
vided by Romano to explain law as institution, 
the idea of criminal organisations (i.e. mafia) as 
autonomous legal orders is articulated on the as-
sumption that their “illicitness” is only relevant 
to the State, while those organizations are legal 
orders insofar they “live” in terms of having their 
effective internal organization. 
2.2 The plurality of legal orders 
and their relations
The second chapter, as already mentioned, is 
dedicated to the plurality of legal orders and their 
reciprocal interplay, as a consequence of the insti-
tutionalist perspective developed in the first part: 
in fact, while every institution is a legal order, the 
equal dignity and autonomy of legal orders does 
not entail their isolation, and every legal order 
shall have its own rules of interaction with exter-
nal ones. According to Romano, the conception 
of legal pluralism aims to overcome that “state-
centred reductionism” based on the link between 
14  Romano differentiates between one (or more) de-
termined legal relationship(s) and the institution: 
in fact, the latter implies relationships but it never 
dissolves into them. On the contrary, the institu-
tion is that organization or structure that is nec-
essary to relationships to be qualified as “legal”, 
whether and when they take place within its sphere 
of influence, p. ivi, 67.
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legal positivism and natural law. If the state-cen-
tred approach can be historically explained as 
an overstatement of an event that surely was of 
great significance (the rising of modern States), 
the idea of a “necessary” connection between law 
and State has to be called into question, together 
with its underlying “mental need” that is similar 
to the idea of God15. 
The description of the different forms of in-
teractions between legal orders is centred on the 
concept of “relevance”. The ways in which two legal 
orders can be relevant to each other are: I) supe-
riority/subordination (A is superior to B); II) pre-
supposition (A presupposes B); III) reciprocal in-
dependence but common dependence with respect 
to a third legal order (A and B depend on C); IV) 
relevance unilaterally granted (A gives effect to B); 
V) succession of legal orders (A is absorbed by B). 
A legal order can be relevant to another 
with regard to different “moments” – that are one 
order’s “existence” (types I and II)16, “content” 
(types I, III, IV, and V)17 and “effects” (types I, II, 
IV, V)18. 
15  Ivi, p. 111: “[…] the analogy between the legal mi-
crocosm and the macrocosm of the universe order 
would require this personification, which makes 
possible the conception of a single will in a har-
monious system”.
16  Some of the examples given by Romano are re-
lated to the relationship between local entities and 
the State (type I) and between member states’ law 
and federal State law, or State law and internation-
al law (type II).
17  A superior legal order can shape or affects the 
content of a lower order (type I): see, for example, 
the relationship between local entities and State 
law or between international law and state law 
(even if, in this last case, the effective superiority of 
international law is more controversial). Two State 
legal orders can be relevant to each other also ac-
cording to type III, for instance when internation-
al law (a third legal order) tries to coordinate State 
legal orders by requiring State legislators to satisfy 
some obligations that depend on the content of 
foreign law. Cases of unilateral determination of 
a legal order by another one (type IV) are those of 
State delegation of administrative and legislative 
functions to local entities and that of private inter-
national law (with referral to foreign norms). The 
incorporation of one legal order into another (type 
V) implies that the content of the dissolving order 
is transferred to the new one, which will result in 
the union of the two previous orders. 
18  One legal order can have “external effects” on an-
other one according to type I, with regard to both 
“complete” subordination (i.e. the effect of State 
law for a local entity depending on that same State 
law) and “partial” subordination (i.e. the effects of 
a Federal State law on member States). Presuppo-
sition (type II) can be referred to the requirement, 
by an international agreement, of a change in the 
State legal order for national implementation, exe-
cution or ratification to be effective. Type IV (uni-
3 Paolo Grossi: law and com-
plexity
Paolo Grossi is an Italian distinguished legal 
scholar and historian of law. He left his position 
as a full-time professor at the University of Flo-
rence in 2008 (at the age of 75) and was appointed 
as one of the 15 Italian constitutional judges in 
2009. He is author of many books and articles, 
in which he has mainly focused on the complex 
link between law and society by both a historical 
perspective and an acute observation of contem-
porary law. Grossi places emphasis on the role of 
legal history for an authentic understanding of 
the law: in fact, as a legal historian, he believes 
that (positive) lawyers must grasp the meaning of 
legal rules beyond the wording of the text, over-
coming the sterile legal formalism by verifying 
the effectiveness of those rules. 
Grossi has been profoundly influenced by 
Santi Romano. Firstly, with regard to the concept 
of (legal) “order”19, he writes that – as referred to 
“harmony in diversity, where harmony wants to 
be respect for and preservation of diversity” – the 
notion of “order” is a precious key to understan-
ding legal transformations from Medieval legal 
complexity to the legal absolutism of the Enligh-
tenment, through the Twentieth Century Law up 
to the informality and factuality of contempo-
rary global law. Secondly, Romano’s legacy is also 
appreciable relating to the idea of the “eclipse” of 
the State, due to its inability to impose order on 
the increasingly complex socio-political and legal 
systems20. In fact, the crisis of the State undoubt-
edly resonates trough Grossi’s work, with par-
ticular reference to his analysis of contemporary 
legal sources.
Grossi’s focus on diversity and legal plural-
ism – as both distinguishing features of law in 
the Middle Ages and paradigms that need to be 
lateral decision of a legal order to give effect to an-
other, independent, order) can be identified when 
a State recognizes effects to foreign law or to some 
aspects of the Church law (i.e. the recognition of a 
religious marriage as well as of additional, “civil”, 
effects). The legal order resulting by the incorpo-
ration of one order into another (type V) can also 
recognize some effects to legal acts of the already 
extinct order. 
19  See GROSSI, Paolo. Ordinamento. Jus. Vol. LIII, 
n. 1, 2006, p. 1-12.
20  See GROSSI, Paolo. “Lo Stato moderno e la sua 
crisi” (a cento anni dalla prolusione pisana di Santi 
Romano). Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico. 
Vol. LXI, n. 1, 2011a, p. 1-22. 
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recovered in contemporary law21 – must be com-
prehended in his broader perspective on legal 
phenomena, which is shaped by some keywords 
(legal absolutism, particularism, pluralism, my-
thologies, modernity, globalization) and pairs 
of opposite concepts (law/State, statute/customs, 
high/low, historicity/fixity, subjectivity/objectivi-
ty, abstractness/concreteness, legality (as confor-
mity to a legal statute)/rule of law (as conformity 
to a higher law), exegesis/interpretation, local/
global, uniformity/fantasy, norm/application, 
private law/public law)22. 
Far from being a point of reference only for 
legal historians, Grossi’s work is also very im-
portant for the study of law in contemporary Eu-
rope, since he criticizes the dominant legal reduc-
tionism (of “law” to “statute”) and promotes the 
objective dimension of law as a social institution, 
considering legal pluralism as the peculiarity of 
an order more consistent with the social body. 
Much of the Tuscan scholar’s attention has 
been dedicated to both legal reality and legal 
thought in the Middle Ages. According to Gros-
si, during that controversial period we witnessed 
the dissolution of the “State” (the Roman Empire’s 
political structure and the culture that existed 
within that structure) and the emergence of a new 
order built on three factors: earth, blood and time:
The Earth, despite its mysterious vastness, is a 
maternal figure because it is productive and pro-
vides subsistence. Blood links human subjects 
together indivisibly and spreads amongst them 
their inheritance of virtue and wealth via means 
that cannot be communicated outwardly. Time 
is duration but is also the hammering of mon-
ths and of years that creates, extinguishes and 
alters23.
The centrality of these three “primordial 
facts” resulted in both the factuality of law and 
the protagonism of groups at the expense of indi-
viduals. “Reicentrism”, “communitarianism” and 
the conception of “law as a factual entity” led to a 
view of the legal world as one of custom, which is 
21  Grossi has been sometimes accused of a “new me-
dievalism” but this seems to be a banalization of 
his thought. As a historian he is fully aware that 
the Middle Ages represents an original, historical-
ly specific experience, which is irremediably gone 
and cannot be recovered, not even as a model.
22  See ALPA, Guido. Paolo Grossi: alla ricerca 
dell’ordine giuridico. In ALPA, Guido (coor.). Pa-
olo Grossi. Ed. Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2011, p. XIV.
23  See GROSSI, Paolo. A History of European Law. Ed. 
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010 (or. ed. 2007), p. 7. 
suggestively described by Grossi as a “path beaten 
through a forest:
The path does not come into existence until an 
enterprising subject takes the first steps in a cer-
tain direction; he is then followed by a crowd 
of imitators, all convinced that his is the most 
rapid way to cross the forest. The path is therefo-
re nothing more than a series of steps, repeated 
consistently over time24.
As a result of the incompleteness of medieval 
political system, law was therefore conceived as a 
“totality of values underlying social and economic 
relationships”, rather than a politically generated 
commandment. This conception of law as an or-
der was characterized by both a bottom-up “or-
ganizing” dimension and legal pluralism, as “the 
possibility of the coexistence of diverse legal or-
ders emanating from diverse social groups, even 
whilst the sovereignty of one political authority 
over the territory those groups inhabit remains 
unquestioned”25. In fact, in every historical civi-
lization where the presence of the State weakens 
or even vanishes, “society” – as a relational, glo-
bal, wide open reality – becomes the protagonist, 
with thousands of bottom-up plural articulations 
such as families, supra-family groups, religious 
bodies, class-based corpora, professional bodies, 
political and social entities of increasing dimen-
sion (from small rural communities right up to 
the Holy Roman Empire or the Church). 
Although the 11th and 12th centuries un-
doubtedly represented a turning point in history 
– with the “mature” Middle Age being characte-
rized by a number of political, social, cultural as 
well as legal innovations – Grossi stresses that the 
fundamental choices of medieval legal thought 
remained substantially constant in terms of con-
tinuing dominance of customary lawmaking and 
the persistence of an emphasis on factuality in 
the law. This remains true even if the increasing 
social, political and economic complexity of the 
late Middle Age asked for more general organi-
zing categories and more rigorous and refined le-
gal approaches than custom’s universe of facts to 
be provided: legal scholarship, as is well-known, 
had a crucial role in designing those laws which 
medieval societies so greatly needed. 
A distinguishing aspect of Grossi’s inves-
tigations concerns the demystification of some 
24  Ivi, 10. 
25  Ivi, 4.
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“modern” conceptual and legal solutions (those 
developed from 16th to 19th century and consecra-
ted with the Enlightenment and the French Re-
volution), which are often presented as unquestio-
nable achievements of a definitive progress, while 
they should be more properly conceived as relative 
outcomes to be deconstructed26. 
According to Grossi the legal and political 
Enlightenment needed “myths”27 to be created, 
since the destruction of ancient convictions and 
institutions had left a void to be filled with alterna-
tive “absolutes”. The new “theorem” of modernity 
was based on some fundamental assumptions: a 
democratic socio-political order, which expresses 
the nation’s general will; political representation 
as the sole instrument for representing one’s will; 
the parliament as the sole institution enabled to 
normatively express the general will (and the 
consequent identification of the general will with 
statute law); the principle of legality as the main 
rule of modern democracies. 
The State as the sole legitimate lawmaker 
(legal monism), the absolute primacy of statute 
law within the hierarchy of legal sources (legal 
absolutism)28, the “state of nature” as a world of 
lonely, absolutely free and equal individuals: the-
se essential features of modern law are ordinarily 
presented as “mythological beliefs”. A critical 
approach, as the one promoted by the Author, 
does not entail that the unquestionable conquers 
of 18th constitutionalism, such as liberal decla-
rations of rights, should be underestimated. Ne-
vertheless, they were “insufficient”, insofar they 
were based on a purely artificial and intellectual 
construction (the “state of nature”) and implied 
a cruel reduction of social and legal complexity. 
If the concrete economic and political in-
terests of the rising bourgeoisie underlying the 
theorem of modernity remained in the shadows, 
26  See GROSSI, Paolo. Mitologie giuridiche della 
modernità. Ed. Milano: Giuffré, 2007.
27  On the concept of “legal myth” see, again, ROMA-
NO, Santi. Frammenti di un dizionario giuridico. 
Ed. Milano: Giuffrè, 1983 (or. ed. 1947), p. 126.
28  As has been previously said, Romano’s idea of 
the “eclipse” of the State certainly affected Gros-
si’s overview of 19th century’s “bourgeois law”: “As 
Romano puts it in his extremely lucid summary, 
the tableau had been reduced to two players: the 
macro-individual of the state, and the micro-indi-
vidual of the single citizen. The sources of law had 
also been reduced: to the written laws of the state in 
the public sphere and to the contract in the private 
sphere. Society itself had been reduced to an anon-
ymous mass of citizens, all formally equal, who 
submitted inertly and passively to the commands 
of the centre of power”, see GROSSI, Paolo. A His-
tory of European Law, cit., p. 138.
the top-down perspective on legal phenomena 
has proved to be pervasive. In fact, since the end 
of the 18th century, at least in continental Euro-
pe, the term “law” has identified the authoritative 
command; furthermore, the success of the con-
ception of law as a norm has meant the loss of 
law’s “sapiential dimension”, in terms of both the 
exclusion of legal scholars from lawmaking and 
the decline of the “ordering” character of law. 
Law is no longer considered as a “social physiolo-
gy”, an entity to be discovered and apprehended 
in the social reality and then translated into ru-
les, but rather a mechanism to deal with the pa-
thologic dimension of social life: the man in the 
street, in the words of Grossi, sees law as some-
thing totally alien to him, that falls on his head 
from above “like a roof tile”.
At the dawn of the 20th century, this scena-
rio began to change, with the irremediable crisis 
of the Nation State and the rediscovery of (social, 
economic, legal) complexity. This rediscovery was 
marked by social and economic transformations, 
epitomized by Grossi as “the emergence of a col-
lective I among the citizenry”29. In opposition to 
the individualist stance of post-Revolutionary 19th 
century law, the rise of different “social forma-
tions” (workers’ organizations, political parties, 
spontaneously born associations) had a disruptive 
effect on the two pillars of that legal system (that 
also corresponded to a specific “legal culture”). 
On the one hand, “the stark separation between 
public law and private law”, which had been recu-
perated by modern legal thought from the ancient 
Roman law, was undermined by the presence of a 
“non-state collective” which was difficult to place. 
On the other hand, “the equally stark division 
between the world of law and the world of facts” 
also began to crack in terms of State monopoly of 
legal sources, since the new economic demands 
and social practices (which were qualified as mere 
“facts” by State law) resulted in the need for new 
forms of law:
Two levels of legality thus developed: that of the 
written law, and that of everyday experience – 
formal law and living law. […] The facts that 
had emerged and been established trough social 
practices were thus enshrined in legislation. At 
the same time, there was now a non-legislative 
means of generating law, leading to two levels of 
law-making – factual and legislative – that were 
not always in harmony30.
29  Ivi, p. 139.
30  Ivi, 140. 
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The movement “State towards society” has 
been deeply marked by two extraordinary events 
occurred in the 20th century.
The first one is the adoption of democra-
tic Constitutions after the Second World War31. 
While liberal constitutions (in particular, the 
part dedicated to the Bill of Rights) were inspired 
by an individualistic conception, with an abstract 
individual as the unitary subject in the state of na-
ture, the new constitutions reflect the (economic, 
social, cultural, religious) pluralism of states in 
the second half of the 20th century. Therefore, in 
addition to the protection of citizens against ar-
bitrary power, democratic constitutions now deal 
with both persons and “intermediate communi-
ties” and recognize principles and rules on edu-
cation, religion, economics, health, environment, 
work and property. For this reason, according to 
Grossi, democratic constitutions are inspired by 
(and cannot help but be inspired by) a “genuine le-
gal pluralism”, which identifies and enhances so-
cial and cultural forces beyond the “positive and 
irreplaceable reality of the State”32.
The second, epochal, event for contemporary 
law to dismiss those state-centred “distorting fil-
ters” and bring to light law’s social roots was the 
creation of a united Europe as a legal laboratory. 
In fact, on the one hand, the European Union ori-
ginates from a single market, which testifies the 
primacy of economics as a concrete and factual 
dimension: “the legal Europe, shaped on the basis 
of the economic Europe, […] is a blatant denial of 
the modern option for pureness and abstractness. 
European law trickles factuality from each of its 
31  Grossi stresses the peculiarity of the “constitu-
tional turn” in Germany and Italy, two countries 
tragically marked by totalitarianism and in search 
for a “refoundation” of the State.
32  See GROSSI, Paolo. Introduzione al Novecento 
giuridico. Ed. Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2012, p. 28. Let 
us consider, with Grossi, the first three articles of 
the 1948 Italian Constitution: “The people [under 
the Article 1] is not an anonymous mass where 
the individual is not very different from ants in 
an anthill. Two dimensions are recognized to the 
individual citizen, who is caught and identified 
as both an individual and as a social agent. […] 
He is regarded within social formations aimed at 
[…] providing him with a congenial environment 
to integrate and develop his potentiality […] This 
is demonstrated by the equality [principle] under 
Article 3, that is so deeply distant from the French 
Revolution egalité: in fact, [the Italian Constitu-
tion’s framers] neither stopped at the first stage 
(that of legal equality) nor opted for a levelling 
collectivism, but put equality well below a float-
ing abstractness, following the Republic’s duty to 
“remove those obstacles of an economic or social 
nature” […]”, ivi, p. 29.
pores”33. On the other hand, Europe can also be 
considered an innovative forum thanks to the os-
motic dynamic between common law34 and civil 
law, which resulted in the primacy of unwritten 
law (i.e. the “common constitutional traditions”) 
and judicial decisions (see the crucial role of both 
the ECJ and the ECtHR in European law-making).
4 Conclusive remarks
The ref lections developed by Santi Roma-
no and Paolo Grossi represent a precious contri-
bution to the studies on legal pluralism as a key 
category for understanding the relation between 
law and social complexity.
The importance of Romano’s thought has 
been expressly acknowledged by many scholars 
working in different fields of law studies. Jaques 
Vanderlinden, among others, mentions several 
times Santi Romano as an essential point of refe-
rence in the theorization of legal pluralism: that 
“magic little book” (L’ordinamento giuridico) was 
decisive for Vanderlinden to approach the topic 
of legal pluralism for the first time and sustain his 
adhesion to the conceptualization of law beyond 
the State35. As for the area of contemporary inter-
national, transnational and global relations, Fili-
ppo Fontanelli identifies several issues for which 
the reference to Romano’s theories can be a useful 
interpretive tool to “frame and conceptualise the 
fragmentation of international law and the rise 
of atypical global governance regimes”36, in ad-
dition to exploring some interesting applications 
in European, international and transnational law. 
In dealing with the relevance of Santi Ro-
mano to modern times, it must be obviously con-
sidered that his thought has been marked by the 
contingencies of his time (the beginning of the 
20th century), as it can be easily argued by the 
33  Ivi, p. 36.
34  According to Grossi, the precious Common Law’s 
lesson is that of law as a “radical reality”, that is to 
say law belongs to one people’s roots and identi-
fies with that people’s history without changeable 
political events being able to affect the law’s deep 
layer, see GROSSI, Paolo. Un impegno per il giuri-
sta di oggi: ripensare le fonti del diritto, in ALPA, 
Guido (coor.). Paolo Grossi. Ed. Roma-Bari: Later-
za, 2011b, p. 30. 
35  See VANDERLINDEN, Jacques. Les pluralismes 
juridiques. Ed. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2013, p. 12.
36  For example with regard to the lex mercatoria, 
the cyber-law, the international sport system. See 
FONTANELLI, Filippo. Santi Romano and L’ordi-
namento giuridico, cit., p. 88-113.
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“institutions” exemplified in the book – such as a 
still solid Nation State (with its public administra-
tion), proliferating “intermediate social bodies” 
(foundations, associations, labor unions, politi-
cal parties, criminal organizations), the Catholic 
Church and an international legal order founded 
on the relations between different States placed 
on the same level.
Nevertheless, this does not put into question 
the significance of Romano’s works for the resear-
ch on social and cultural diversity as a source of 
legal pluralism. In fact, his theories still represent 
a remarkable contribution to a pragmatic and 
empiric attitude towards the legal phenomenon, 
thanks to the conception of the “institution” “not 
as a merely systematic concept, but as a repre-
sentation of a segment of reality”37. He promoted 
an idea of law (and of legal order) as strictly con-
nected to social facts and to the “real” dimension 
of “effectiveness”, irrespectively of how State law 
qualifies those (non-State) legal expressions from 
its viewpoint. In rejecting essentialist and abs-
tracts concepts of law, he supported an “inner” 
perspective on legal phenomena. While some Ro-
mano’s insights still prove to be enlightening with 
regard to the interaction of different legal orders38, 
his theory is less suited to conceptualize the “sub-
jective” dimension of legal pluralism, that focuses 
on the active role of individuals within the dif-
ferent normative communities (such as families, 
cultural and religious groups, etc.) in which they 
are involved and under which they recognize and 
produce their own legal subjectivity39. 
37  See LA TORRE, Massimo. Law as Institution, cit., 
2010, p. 98 n. 10.
38  See KISLOWICZ, Howard. Sacred Laws in Earth-
ly Courts: Legal Pluralism in Canadian Religious 
Freedom Litigation. Queen’s Law Journal. v. 39, 
n. 1, 2013, p. 208 and 220, for example, mentions 
Romano’s theories in connection with the rela-
tionship between state and religious legal norms. 
GARRÉ, Roy. Non di solo diritto. Spunti di rifles-
sione, ad uso della storia giuridica, sul rapporto fra 
diritto ed altri ordinamenti normativi. Forum His-
toriae Iuris. 14 Feb. 2003, stresses the importance 
of the theoretical framework developed by Roma-
no for the studies on folk law and subaltern legal 
cultures. The Canadian sociologist ROCHER, Guy. 
Pour une sociologie des ordres juridiques. Cahiers 
de droit. N. 1, 1988, p. 99, has been one of the early 
re-discoverers of Romano’s legal institutionalism 
and of its usefulness in the theorizations of con-
temporary pluralism. 
39  See FARALLI, Carla, FACCHI, Alessandra. Plu-
ralità delle fonti e modelli teorici: dalle premesse 
storiche agli sviluppi attuali. In: PATTARO, Enrico. 
Problemi della produzione e dell’attuazione norma-
tiva. Ricerca Murst ex 40%, 1997, <http://www.cir-
sfid.unibo.it>. For the concepts of “code switching” 
and “cultural navigation” see R. Ballard (1994).
A further lesson to keep in mind is related 
to Romano’s aversion to absolutizing legal cate-
gories and institutions – such State centralism –, 
which are, at the end of the day, quite recent, if 
comprehended with a historical and comparati-
ve perspective. This critical attitude is shared by 
Paolo Grossi, whose relevance to the conception 
of social diversity as legal pluralism is clearly re-
lated to his critique of modern individualism (as 
a theoretical premise of the conception of law as 
a general and abstract norm), in favour of a com-
plex understanding of law as a physiology of plu-
ralistic societies.
By drawing a parallel between the Midd-
le Ages’ social and legal fragmentation and the 
complex articulation of contemporary Western 
societies, Grossi shows that legal pluralism is a 
key category to both recognize and promote law 
as connected “to a plurality of social institutions, 
beyond monism of modern legal positivism”40. 
Paolo Grossi’s attitude about the relationship be-
tween law and society seems to be particularly 
coherent with the valorization of individuals’ di-
versified legal belongings, due to his belief in the 
centrality of multiple social (as well as cultural 
and religious) groups within which individuals 
are situated and, more generally, the necessary 
correspondence between legal regulations and 
“effective” social reality. 
On the other hand, Grossi is fully aware that 
legal pluralism and legal particularism do not en-
tail a short-sighted critique of State law: in fact, 
one of the major challenges that contemporary 
legal scholars have to face is precisely to acknowl-
edge the role of the State as crucial in creating the 
conditions for the enhancement of the “particu-
lar” in the framework of “universal” rights and 
guarantees. 
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Breves reflexões sobre o pluralismo jurídico como paradigma 
fundamental do direito contemporâneo nas sociedades  
ocidentais altamente diferenciadas
Resumo
Muitos estudiosos, de diferentes disciplinas, utilizam a categoria do “pluralismo jurídico” para expli-
car a dimensão jurídica da crescente diversificação cultural, religiosa e social das sociedades ociden-
tais. Sendo um conceito particularmente complexo, a noção de “pluralismo jurídico” obriga a uma sua 
profundisação a fim de compreender melhor as suas muitas implicações e para aumentar o seu poten-
cial explicativo como paradigma de compreensão da complexidade jurídica das sociedades altamente 
diferenciadas. Neste assunto, o contributo da doutrina jurídica italiana oferece uma valiosa inspiração. 
Por um lado, Santi Romano - teórico do direito em atividade na primeira metade do século XX - pode 
ser considerado um dos fundadores do pluralismo jurídico: com a sua obra prima “O ordenamento 
jurídico” (1918) ele tratou o pluralismo jurídico desde uma perspectiva antiformalista, em oposição ao 
positivismo jurídico. Por outro lado, os trabalhos de Paolo Grossi - um historiador do direito que tra-
tou o pluralismo jurídico em quanto caraterística do direito na Idade Media - são assim mesmo muito 
importantes para o estudo do direito da Idade contemporânea, em quanto ele critica o dominante 
reducionismo jurídico e promove a dimensão objetiva do direito como instituição social.
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